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Abstract
When one’s treatment status affects the outcomes of others, experimental data are not suf-
ficient to identify a treatment causal impact. In order to account for peer effects in program
response, we use a social network model. We estimate and validate the model on experimental
data collected for the evaluation of a scholarship program in Colombia. By design, randomiza-
tion is at the student-level. Friendship data reveals that treated and untreated students interact
together. Besides providing evidence of peer effects in schooling, we find that ignoring peer
effects would have led us to overstate the program actual impact.
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Welfare programs may impose positive or negative effects on individuals who are not di-
rectly targeted by them but who interact with beneficiaries (Kremer and Miguel 2007, Oster and
Thornton 2011, Bhattacharya et al. 2013). This complicates the evaluation of targeted interven-
tions (Manski 2013a, Manski 2013b). The goal of this paper is to build a framework to evaluate
the impact of a program, accounting for possible peer effects. We illustrate the relevance of our
framework by assessing an education program targeted to the poor in Colombia.
Peer effects are important in many contexts. Peers share resources, information and learn
from each other. Behaviour such as crime, alcohol and drug consumption, failure at school may
be reinforced through social interactions. Taking the influence of peers into account is therefore
important to evaluate interventions designed to help people escape poverty traps (Durlauf, 2006).
Providing an accurate assessment of peer effects is, however, difficult (Manski, 1993). We first
need to identify the appropriate peer groups. In the context of schooling decisions, they may in-
clude neighbours, schoolmates, classmates, and friends. Secondly, schooling outcomes are often
highly correlated among peers. We can expect, for instance, children from similar background
to interact together in the same schools. The best schools may also be able to attract the best
teachers and unobserved teacher quality may explain average school performance. Besides en-
dogenous sorting and common unobservables, identification is also hindered by simultaneity, as
own schooling outcome depends on peers’ outcomes, which itself depend on own outcome, a
problem also known as the “reflection problem” (Manski, 1993).
In this paper, we provide a bridge between the reduced-form approach that exploits the ran-
dom assignment of a treatment and the structural approach to estimate peer influence. Our work
offers four main contributions. To our knowledge, we are the first to propose a structural model to
account for social network effects in treatment response, to discuss identification of the model and
to show how to use it to define parameters of interest for policy evaluation. A second contribution
of our work is to propose a novel way of using randomized experiments to validate a model. Our
third contribution is to show that ignoring peer effects may undermine our assessment of a pro-
gram’s impact. Finally, we show how we can use a model of peer effects to evaluate the overall
impact of an intervention. We discuss parameters of interest for policy evaluation. We apply our
framework to data from an experiment that randomly assigned school grants to children. To do
so, we extend the model and results to account for missing data on nonparticipants.
A small and recent literature on treatment effects exploits exogenous variation in the local
intensity of treatment to study social and neighborhood influences in partial population experi-
ments (Kremer and Miguel 2007, Oster and Thornton 2011, Bhattacharya et al. 2013). However,
this literature is silent on the nature of the spillover effects that are identified. A model is useful
to dissect the process of contamination when treated and untreated student interact. For spillover
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effects to materialize, the program must first have a direct effect on its recipients. Complemen-
tarities in time spent in social activities outside school may then lead children to attend school
more when their peers do. This so-called endogenous peer effect, translates into a social multiplier,
through which the direct effect of the program may be magnified. Finally, in addition to being
influenced by peer attendance, attendance to school may change as more peers get treated. This
contextual effect of the treament may be positive or negative depending on the mechanism at play.
We show that the sign of the error from ignoring peer influence depends on the strength and di-
rection of the direct program impact, resulting from the initial response to changes in incentives,
and of indirect peer effects.1
The structural approach takes peer effects as the primary object of interest. A social network
model of peer effects has proved successful on a number of fronts (see e.g., Bramoullé et al. 2009,
Laschever 2009, Lee et al. 2010 , Lin 2010, Calvo-Armengol et al. 2009). First, it can convincingly
address the problem of identifying the appropriate peer groups. Second, better data on links be-
tween agents helps for the identification problems. In particular, a social network approach does
not impose that everyone within a group interacts with everyone else and with no one outside, as
in a group structure. It recognizes that some links are not present. In a linear-in-means model,2
these natural restrictions prove sufficient to address the simultaneity problem in the absence of
other sources of spurious correlation (Bramoullé et al. 2009, thereafter BDF 2009).
The social network approach, however, has two important shortcomings. First, although it
offers a solution to the reflection problem, it falls short of providing a convincing answer to the
problem of correlated unobservables. Most papers in this literature correct for correlated unob-
servables through network fixed effects. These capture factors that are common to all students in
a network. But fixed effects may not correctly address the problem of endogenous sorting within
the network. Identification typically fails if social links are not made at random within the net-
work.3 Treatment randomization allows us to address the problem of correlated unobservables,
without having to assume that they are fixed within network. Indeed, even though friendship
links may be endogenously formed, the fraction of treated friends is exogenous because treat-
ment assignment is random. Similarly, even if teachers are not randomly assigned to classrooms
or schools, a student’s treatment status and the treatment status of his friends are determined by
chance.
A downside of relying on any structural model of peer effects is that the framework that de-
1An intuitive reasoning may mislead us to think that, when treated and untreated individuals interact, the difference
in mean outcomes between experimental groups underestimates the actual program impact.
2According to a linear-in-means model, a student’s attendance to school may depend on his treatment, the average
treatment among his peers, and his peers’ average attendance.
3For instance, an unobserved factor may explain both heterogeneity in school outcomes and the structure of friendship
within the classroom.
3
scribes how peer effects are generated may be invalid. For instance, misspecification may occur
if the model assumes that all peers have the same impact when, in reality, “bad” peers have a
negative effect on performance because of the disruption they produce and “good” peers have
a positive or no effect. We exploit the experimental nature of the data to offer a novel way to
validate our model.4 We show how the naive difference in expected outcome between the treated
and untreated is related to the structural parameters of the model, i.e., direct program effect and
indirect peer effects. Comparing the experimental to structural estimates allow us to test the social
network model.
Typically in randomized experiments, data only covers program participants, i.e., treated and
untreated students. Yet a student may well name as a friend a nonparticipant fellow. In a social
network model, nonparticipant friends may well matter, for instance, if they transmit program
effects from treated to untreated participants. We thus extend our social network model to allow
for missing data on nonparticipants.
In our application, we focus on schooling decisions of poor Colombians in Bogota. Poverty
affects about a third of the 8.5 million population of the city. Bogota, as many other large cities in
Latin America, is highly segregated, with pockets of poverty in certain neighborhoods. Although
relatively high for a developing country, average enrolment also hides a lot of heterogeneity, espe-
cially at the secondary level. In this context, peer effects may be expected to reinforce educational
disparities, trapping young people in a bad equilibrium. In the randomized experiment described
in Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011), cash transfers are allocated among poor children using a lottery.
Random assignment is done at the individual student-level in two poor neighborhoods of the
capital city. The program is still active and has now expanded to cover about 130,000 students.
We focus on the impact on school attendance. Regular school attendance is one condition to
continue receiving the subsidy. Data on attendance is collected over a period of 13 weeks during
which research staff visited schools unannounced, calling the roll and marking absences. Data
are available on school participation of all the children enrolled in all intervention schools, as well
as on their friendship network. Children are requested to name their five best friends. We use
(preprogram) data on self-reported friendship links collected at the start of the schooling year
(attendance data is collected 5 months later). We thus know the treatment status of each child
(i.e., whether he was picked up as a lottery recipient), his schooling outcome, the proportion of
his friends who are treated, and their schooling outcomes. This makes these data suitable to apply
our framework.
We find that the direct program impact and the endogenous peer effect are positive and the
contextual effect is negative. The endogenous effect does translate into a social multiplier for
4Randomized experiments have been successfully used to validate econometric models (LaLonde 1986, Todd and
Wolpin 2006).
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school attendance, which magnifies the direct program impact. But, increases in the fraction of
treated peers results into a drop in attendance. Indirect evidence suggest that this effect is consis-
tent with substitution between own and peers labor supply. Although direct impact and indirect
peer effects are all statistically significant at 1 percent, the resulting net effect of the program is
close to zero and not significant. Ignoring peer effects thus leads to overestimating the actual ef-
fect of the program. Our empirical findings are robust to a number of specification checks. Based
on our model validation strategy, we find that the model is well specified.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 1, we present details of the program
and describe the experiment. In section 2, we lay out our econometric framework. Data are
presented in section 3. Empirical results are discussed in section 4, where we also present some
specification tests. We conclude in section 5.
1 The program and the experiment
1.1 Subsidios Condicionados a la Asistencia Escolar
Subsidios Condicionados a la Asistencia Escolar (cash transfers conditional on school attendance)
is a local program created to reduce dropout rates in Bogota. Cash transfer programs are a popular
tool for reducing current poverty and improving human capital investments. Two influential
programs (PROGRESA-Opportunidades in Mexico and Bolsa-Familia in Brazil) serve as a model
replicated in various countries (see, e.g., Fiszbein et al., 2009 for a review). Colombia also launched
in 2002 a cash transfer program aimed at communities of less than 100, 000 inhabitants (Familias en
accion). In contrast, Subsidios Condicionados a la Asistencia Escolar is piloted over two localities of the
district of Bogota, a municipality comprised of 20 localities. The rationale is to reach a population
who is not eligible to Familias en accion. Indeed, most of the population lives in large cities and thus
do not qualify for Familias en accion. Furthermore, this pilot allows experimenting with various
ways of delivering the cash transfers (every two months, partly every two months and partly at
the beginning of the next school year, partly every two months and upon graduation).5
The program distributes cash transfers to poor families conditional on having children attend
school on a regular basis (i.e., at least 80 percent of the time). Its objective is to lower dropout and
help limit child labor.6 The transfers amount to 30, 000 pesos or $15 per month. They represent
about 8 percent of the median income of recipient households. They cover the cost of sending
a child to school, including enrollment fees, uniforms and school material. The program was
5In our analysis, we do not distinguish between all different ways of delivering cash benefits.
6Based on the Colombian Child Labor survey of 2001, about 10 percent of 5-14 years old children are working. Boys are
more likely to participate than girls (14.1% of boys vs. 6.6% of girls). More than 75 percent of working children combine
work (paid or unpaid) and study.
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launched in 2005 by the Secretary of Education of the City over two localities of the district of
Bogota (Suba and San Cristobal). Children eligibility depends on their parents’ income. A na-
tional registry classifies households according to their wealth to identify those eligible for social
programs. Only the bottom two categories are eligible to these cash transfers. There is also a
residency requirement (children had to reside in the localities prior to 2004). The program targets
secondary-school children from grade 6 to 11 (age 10 to 17 on average). The intervention lasted
for three years.7 The pilot study covers the first year, from February 2005 to February 2006. The
program is still active, and targeting more than 130, 000 students.
1.2 The experiment
1.2.1 Timeline
Subsidios Condicionados a la Asistencia Escolar was advertised at the start of the academic year
in January-February 2005 (see timeline in Figure 1). Registration to the program in Suba and
San Cristobal was open during 15 days at the end of February-beginning of March 2005. In San
Cristobal, the pilot program targets children who completed grade 5 (i.e., who are entering basic
secondary school). Suba targets children who completed grade 8 (those in grade 9 to 11). There
was oversubscription at the registration stage. A public lottery, selecting beneficiaries among the
applicants, was held in each locality on April 4th 2005. This means that two separate randomized
experiments were held, one for each locality. By design, randomization is done at the individual
level.
Start of academic year: 









of the program 
Registration  
to the program 
Lottery 





End of academic year 
Figure 1: Timeline
Data on school attendance was collected at the end of the school year, about 5 months after the
baseline survey that collects data on friendship links.
7An academic year runs from end of January to mid-November.
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1.2.2 Treatments
Two distinct treatments were offered in San Cristobal. One consists in providing 30, 000 pesos
per month (equivalent to US$15), a payment made every two months. The other consists in pro-
viding 2/3 of the annual benefit on a two-month basis and 1/3 at enrolment at the next academic
year. The two treatment groups are about the same size. Children had to attend school at least
80 percent of time each month. The funds are made available in a bank account and students
could lose their benefits if one of the three following situations occurred: failure to matriculate
to the next grade twice, failure to reach the attendance target in two successive payment periods,
or exclusion from school. In Suba, all beneficiary children received 2/3 of the transfer every two
months as well as a lump-sum transfer representing 1/3 of the amount conditional on graduating
from high school. We make use of the experiments separately although we do not distinguish in
the case of San Cristobal between the two treatments.
2 Econometric model
We now present our econometric framework. It is motivated by our empirical application on
the effect of Subsidios Condicionados a la Asistancia Escolar on school attendance. In section 2.1, we
introduce a linear model of peer effects in which we allow for student specific peer groups. A
student regular attendance to school may be affected by his treatment, his peers’ treatments and
his peers’ attendance. We study identification and show how it depends on random assignment
of treatment and the geometric properties of social network structure. In section 2.2, we extend
the model to show how to account for missing data on students who did not apply to the program
(nonparticipants).8 In section 2.3, we discuss how to evaluate a program’s impact in the presence
of peer effects. We define and discuss direct and total impact. We also show that the naive differ-
ence in expected outcomes between treated and untreated participants is generally not equal to
the (direct or total) program impact. We relate all the impact parameters to the structural param-
eters of the model of peer effects.
2.1 A model of treatment and peer effects
Let yis be individual i’s outcome in school s, (i = 1, ..., N) and (s = 1, ..., S) where N is the
number of applicants to the program and S the number of participating schools. Let xis be (1×K)
vector of characteristics for individual i. For simplicity, we present the model with one character-
istic (K = 1), but the results hold for anyK. Let tis take value 1 if student i in school s is randomly
assigned to the treatment group, 0 otherwise. Each individual i has a specific reference group Ni
8Non-participants students are either non eligible or eligible but not registered. As explained in the previous section,
to be eligible to the program, a student must belong to a poor family and apply to the program.
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of size ni. This group should include all individuals whose outcomes or background character-
istics affect i’s outcome.9 We develop our analysis in two stages. In this section, we assume that
everyone in the participating schools applies to the program. However, in our sample, we only
observe information on students who registered to the lottery, i.e., participating students. Data on
nonparticipant is missing. In the next section, we extend the analysis to account for missing data
on nonparticipants.
We adopt the standard model of peer effects studied, for instance, in BDF (2009) and De Giorgi
et al. (2010). We assume that a student’s outcome may be affected by his own attributes, by his
friends’ mean attribute and by their mean outcome:
yis = α+ β(Gy)is + γxis + γ1tis + δ(Gx)is + δ1(Gt)is + is, (1)
where G is a N × N interaction matrix, with element Gij = 1/ni if j is a friend of i, and





. The error term is reflects unobservables characteristics of student i in school
s.
This model captures three types of effects. First, γ1 and γ simply represent the effects of own
treatment ti and own attribute xi on outcome yi. Second, δ1 and δ capture the impacts of the
proportion of treated friends (Gt)is on an individual outcome. In the peer effect literature, they
are usually referred to as contextual peer effects. Third, β is the endogenous peer effect; that is, the
impact of friends’ mean outcome (Gy)is on i’s outcome yis.
Since we are mainly interested in the direct and social effects of the program, i.e., in parameters
(β, γ1, δ1), we can further reduce the model to:
yis = α+ β(Gy)is + γ1tis + δ1(Gt)is + uis, (2)
where uis = is−γxis − δ(Gx)is.
We now discuss identification of model (2). First, observe that randomization balances un-
observable effects in the two experimental groups. Randomization also insures that individual
attributes, xis, and friends attributes, (Gx)is, are balanced between the two experimental groups,
implying that E[xis | tis] = 0 and E[(Gx)is | tis] = 0. Treatment randomization is not sufficient,
however, to guarantee identification. Observe that model (2) defines a system of simultaneous
linear equations. This system is potentially subject ot the reflection problem (Manski, 1993), as yi
depends on yj , which itself may depend on yj . In matrix notation, model (2) becomes:
y = α1 + βGy + γ1t + δ1Gt + u.
9Individual i is excluded from his reference group, that is, i /∈ Ni.
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Assuming |β| < 1, matrix I − βG is invertible and the associated reduced-form model for this
system of simultaneous equations is:
y = α(I− βG)−11 + (I− βG)−1(γ1I + δ1G)t + (I− βG)−1u. (3)
Expanding the inverse into a series and assuming that no individual is isolated, we obtain:
yis =
α
1− β + γ1tis + (γ1β + δ1)Σ
∞
k=0(β)
k(Gk+1t)is + vis, (4)
where vis = Σ∞k=0(β)
k(Gku)is.
Thanks to treatment randomization, reduced-form parameters, i.e., the effect of own treatment
and peers treatment, are identified from unobserved correlated effects that may arise from sorting
and common shocks. Indeed, if friendship links are not affected by the treatment, i.e., E[Gij | t] =
E[Gij ], then E[vis | t,G] = 0. For all k, (Gku) is simply a n × 1 vector of weighted averages of
distance-k friends’ attributes. As a result of treatment randomization, both tis, own treatment,
and (Gk+1t)is, peers treatment, are exogenous to (Gku)is, and thus to vis.
From the estimation of the reduced-form equation (4), we can identify the structural param-
eters in (2), i.e., (α, β, γ1, δ1), if I, G and G2 are linearly independent and γ1β + δ1 6= 0 (see BDF
2009 for a proof of this result). In particular, these three matrices are linearly independent in the
presence of intransitivity, i.e., if there exists three individuals i, j, k, such that i is friend to j and
j is friend to k but i and k are not friends. Intransitivity has a natural interpretation in terms of
instrumental variables: k’s treatment should only affect i’s behavior through its effect on j’s be-
havior. More generally, it is the heterogeneity in the structure of the network that helps break the
simultaneity or reflection problem (Manski, 1993). In practice, it is easy to check that i, G and G2
are linearly independent with the data at hand. We now summarize these results in Proposition 1
below.
Proposition 1 Assume that friendship is not affected by the treatment and that the friendship network has
some intransitivity. Randomization at the individual level allows identification of direct program effect,
indirect endogenous peer effect and indirect contextual peer effect.
Compared to the identification results in BDF (2009), treatment randomization allows us to
relax the assumption that correlated effects must be fixed at the level of the network, but requires
us to assume that students do not re-sort on the basis of treatment status, i.e., E[Gij | t] =E[Gij ].10
10In contrast, Comola and Prina, 2013 propose a framework in which the network may change as a result of an exoge-
nous intervention. They apply it to experimental data collected to assess the effect of a new saving technology in Nepal.
They map the network of financial exchanges between all villagers before and after the intervention. A large part of the
peer effect on expenditures comes from the recomposition of the network resulting from changes in expenditures. In our
application, we do not account for this channel. Our estimated peer effects would be biased downward if, as a result of
the subsidy program, children who attend school regularly are more likely to create links with other children who also
9
In BDF (2009), it is assumed that only unobserved effects that are fixed at the level of schools may
cause spurious correlations. This assumption is too strong if, conditional on joining a school, links
are not formed at random. In particular, if there is homophily based on a characteristic that is also
correlated to the outcome of interest, then unobserved correlated effects due to sorting may still
bias the estimates. In the result section, we compare estimates for model (2) with random effects
(our preferred specification) and with fixed effects. We expect both estimators to be consistent if
the network fixed effects are uncorrelated to the treatment.
2.2 Treatment of missing data
We now adapt and extend the model to account for missing data on nonparticipant friends
in the friendship network. In our data, we only have information on program applicants; this is
typical of data collected to assess the average effect of a program on participants. In the presence
of peer effects, however, nonparticipants may matter. For instance, they may help transmit pro-
gram impacts from treated to untreated participants.Yet, we do not observe the full network of
interactions. In this section, we show how to correct for this incompleteness for the estimation
of model (2).11 Our correction makes use of the fact that, in our data, we know the number of
nonparticipant friends for each participant.
Even in our extended model, however, we ignore external effects of the program on the group
of nonapplicants. One argument for focussing on the set of applicants is that it is the population
of interest to the policy-maker who is deciding whether to continue or extend the program. If the
program does not pass the cost-effectiveness test when excluding benefits to noneligible people,
the recommandation will likely be to stop funding it, even if there is evidence that nonapplicants
benefit from it.12
Our treatment of missing data is based on two intuitive elements. First, randomness in the
program selection process implies that we can expect treated and untreated applicants to have
the same number of nonapplicant friends, and friends who are similar in terms of observed and
unobserved characteristics.13 Another and more technical argument relates to the conditions for
identification. Intuitively, identification relies on the fact that the friend of a friend may not be
attend school regularly and drop links with those who do not. This change in friendship structure should have taken place
within the same school year, in a 5-month interval. In the absence of longitudinal data on friendship links, we cannot test
this hypothesis.
11Chandrasekhar and Lewis (2011) also study how missing data may affect estimation of a social network model in the
special case where nodes are selected randomly, i.e., where data on social contacts are only collected for a random subset
of individuals.
12Ignoring external effects to non-participants may not always be justified, see Miguel and Kremer (2004). Yet, it is very
plausible that, in our context, policy-makers do not care much about external effects to children from well-off families.
13We test the first statement using the data at hand, but cannot test whether characteristics of nonapplicant friends are
similar, since we do not have any information of nonapplicants.
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a direct friend. Not observing nonparticipants implies that we will not observe some of these
intransitive triads. But all the intransitive triads that we observe between applicants are indeed
intransitive. As long as we observe enough of these intransitive triads, we should be able to
identify the structural parameters of the model. More formally, in our setting, we know the total
number of friends for each participant (i = 1, ..., N) from school (s = 1, ..., S), nis, and the number
of friends among participants, mis. We can thus decompose the proportion of treated among


























if i and j are friends, 0 otherwise. The first equality is implied by the fact that none of
the nonparticipants are treated (Dis = 0 ⇒ tis = 0). Consequently, the treatment vector is only
defined for participants (size N × 1). Similarly, consider the following expression for the average











































where, G1 is defined as previously. The observed y is of size N, and the unobserved y0 is of size
J, where J is the total number of nonparticipants who are friends to participants. The N × J ma-
trix G0 represents social interactions between each participant i ∈ [1, N ] and his nonparticipants
friends. Observe that nis−misnis (G
0y0)is is unobserved because missing.
We can now transform model (2) to account for missing data on nonparticipants:
yis = α+ β
mis
nis
(G1y)is + γ1tis + δ1
mis
nis
(G1t)is + uis. (5)
Compared to model (2) in the previous section, we now weight the observed network interaction
matrix to account for missing data on nonparticipants using the proportion of participants among
friends, misnis . In addition, the error term uis now includes as an additional term the unobserv-
able nis−misnis (G
0y0)is. Importantly, the proportion of friends who are nonparticipants, nis−misnis ,
is uncorrelated with treatment, and so is (G0y0)is. Consequently, as in the general setting, the
reduced-form of this model is identified if students do not re-sort on the basis of treatment sta-
tus. Similarly, structural parameters (α, β, γ1, δ1) are identified if the friendship network between
participants is intransitive. In Appendix A, we write model (5) in matrix notation.
2.3 Parameters of interest
How can program impacts be evaluated in the presence of peer effects? In the literature on
treatment effects, most studies rely on the assumption that individual outcomes are invariant
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with respect to other individuals’ treatment assignment. This assumption, also known in the
statistical literature as the Stable Unit Value Assumption (SUTVA), does not hold in the presence
of social interactions between treated and untreated participants, however.14 In the presence of
social interactions, the program may affect participants in two ways. There may be a direct effect
due to changes in individuals’ incentives and also an indirect effect caused by social interaction.
In this section, we study program impacts in the presence of peer effects structured as in the
general model (2).15
We now define the direct and total effects of the program, and relate them to the structural
parameters of model (2). The average total effect of the treatment in the population, ∆tot, which
corresponds to the intervention scaled up to include all participants, is defined as follows:
∆tot = E(y|t = 1)− E(y|t = 0). (6)
The first term is the expected outcome when all applicants are treated, and the second one is the
expected outcome when no one receives the program. Intuitively, the larger the fraction treated,
the larger the indirect effects, so that a scaled-up program treating all participants generates the
highest indirect effect in absolute term. Thus, the total effect of pilot program for which cover-
age is only partial is different from the total effect for a program offering benefits to all eligible
individuals (Philipson 2000). This is why we focus on the latter, as defined in (6).
From reduced-form (3), observe that:
E(y|t = 1) = α(I− βG)−11 + (I− βG)−1(γ1I + δ1G)1,
E(y|t = 0) = α(I− βG)−11.
If there is no isolated individual, this yields:16
E(y|t = 1)− E(y|t = 0) = γ1 + δ1





This is the composite social effect in Manski’s seminal paper (1993). If there are no endogenous
and no contextual effects, δ1 = β = 0, or no interactions between agents, then ∆tot reduces to γ1,
and randomization of treatment is sufficient to identify the average total effect of the treatment
in the population, which is equal to γ1 in model (5). If γ1 > 0 (a positive direct effect of the
treatment), δ1 > 0 (a positive contextual effect of the treatment) and 0 < β < 1 (a positive, but
14In the following, we do not attempt to provide the full specification of potential outcomes. Rather, and to be precise,
we call untreated individuals (ti = 0) those who have not received the treatment, although they may be affected by the
treatment status of their peers. Treated individuals can be directly and indirectly affected by the treatment.
15The results also hold for the special case model (5) with missing data on nonparticipants.
16Replace matrixG by matrixH as defined in Appendix A to obtain a similar result for model (5).
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not too large, endogenous effect), then the direct effect of the program on the participants, γ1,
underestimates the total effect of the program, ∆tot. If γ1 > 0, δ1 < 0 and the contextual effect
is larger in magnitude than the direct effect, ignoring peer effects may lead to overestimating the
effect of the program. In our empirical analysis below, we provide estimates for the direct effect,
γ1, and the total program effect, ∆tot.
For our last result in this section, let us look at the difference in expected outcomes between
treated and untreated participants. This is a natural benchmark parameter: in the absence of peer
effects, this difference identifies the average effect of the treatment on the treated. This does not
hold in the presence of peer effects, however. In the following, we express this difference as a
function of the structural parameters and of the network:17
Proposition 2
E[yis | tis = 1]−E[yis | tis = 0] = γ1 + (γ1β + δ1) 1
N
Tr((G(I− βG)−1)) (8)
Randomization is key for this result to hold. The proof is derived in Appendix B and relies on
three arguments: (1) the expected fraction of treated friends at distance k (excluding oneself) is the
same for treated and untreated individuals, (2) the unobserved effects are also balanced between
the treated and the untreated, (3) treated units may experience an effect of own treatment that
feeds back from interactions with others.
The difference in expected outcomes between treated and untreated participants is the sum
of two terms. The first term, γ1, is simply the direct effect due to changes in students’ incentives
resulting from the treatment. This is the program impact when there are no peer effects (β = δ1 =
0 or no interactions between students). The second term captures how the direct treatment effect
gets modified through interactions with others. The ith diagonal element of matrix G(I− βG)−1
is equal to a weighted sum of the number of cycles from i to i in the graph.18 When i is treated,
this affects his direct friends both through contextual effects (δ1) and endogenous effects (γ1β).
In turn, they affect friends at distance 2, 3, and so on, and all these indirect effects eventually
find their way back to i through cycles in the graph. Thus, the difference in expected outcomes
between treated and untreated participants accounts for both the direct effect from own treatment
and the indirect effects back to one-self. We label this effect the individual mirror effect:




In general, it is not equal to the direct (γ1) or total program impact (γ1+δ11−β ).
17Again, simply replace matrixG by matrixH as defined in Appendix A to obtain a similar result for model (5).
18A cycle starting at i is a set of individuals j1, ..., jl such that i is friend with j1, j1 is friend with j2, ..., and jl is friend
with i.
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An interesting implication of (8) is that it can be used to validate the model. Indeed, if model
(2) is well-specified, then we should not reject the null that E[yis | tis = 1]−E[yis | tis = 0] =
γ1 + (γ1β + δ1)
1
N Tr((G(I − βG)−1)). We implement this test in the empirical section. We also
provide evidence on the size of the error we would make by ignoring social interaction effects in
our assessment of the program.
3 Data
3.1 Description of the data and sample
During two weeks at the end of February-beginning of March 2005, all eligible parents resid-
ing in Suba and San Cristobal were invited to register their children to the program. On April 4th
2005, a lottery selecting beneficiaries among applicants was held (one in each locality). In total,
the lotteries were run over more than 17, 000 applications, of which 10, 000 received the subsidy
and close to 7, 000 did not. However, owing to budget limitations, only a subset of schools was
included in the study sample.19 The study focuses on 68 of the 251 schools in Suba and San Cristo-
bal with the largest number of applicants. Every applicant in the selected schools is included in
the study sample. The resulting sample size is 6, 886, including 1, 146 pupils in Suba (527 treated
and 619 untreated applicants) and 5, 740 in San Cristobal (3, 722 treated and 2, 018 untreated ap-
plicants). The distribution of the sample by locality and treatment status is provided in Table 1.20
Since the sample is larger for San Cristobal, our preferred estimates are based on this sample.
However, we also present and discuss estimates for Suba.
Baseline data was collected in May-July 2005, a month after random assignment. The baseline
survey instrument was administered to applicant children. The follow-up was collected at the
beginning of the next academic year, in February-March 2006.21 For the follow-up, households to
which applicant children belong were visited. More than 98 percent of the children surveyed in
the first round were found.22 In addition, between baseline and follow-up data collections, teams
of research assistants were sent to gather direct observations on attendance of children to schools
19Survey data was only collected for the study sample.
20All applicants in the 68 schools are included in the attendance data, but only 91% of these are surveyed at base-
line. Because we construct social networks based on information provided in the baseline survey, our working sample is
restricted to those who responded to the survey (6, 886 children out of 7, 569).
21Baseline data include information on family structure and school related expenses, as well as children labor force
participation, their education, aspirations, and friendship network. Follow-up data gathers the same type of information
as the baseline, except for the friendship network. In addition, they include grades in Math, Sciences and Spanish.
22This includes children who did not re-enrolled in the next academic year. However, we do not observe grades for
these children. Since the program affects dropout, then “test-takers” in the treatment group and “test-takers” in the
control group are not drawn from the same population, as in Angrist et al. (2006). Thus, we do not consider grades as an
outcome variable for our model.
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for a period of 13 weeks around the end of the 2005 school year. The visits were not announced in
advance and the assistants called the roll of all students and marked absences.
For this study, we use data from the baseline and postprogram data on school attendance.
The baseline survey includes a question on friendship relationships, worded as follows: “Make
a list of 5 best friends who study in your school (or classmates with whom you spend most of your time),
including their full names and last names”. Children could nominate friends who did not apply to
the program, but the network is limited to the school and only five nominations are permitted.
In practice, less than 1 percent of students friends are not in the same grade level, and less than 1
percent nominate 5 friends, so the framing of the question is not binding. In San Cristobal, there
are 15.1 percent of student for whom we do not have information on any friend. There are two
reasons for that. We find that 3 percent of them do not actually report having any friend and
are not designated as friends by other. We consider them as socially isolated. The other reason
is that the study is restricted to applicants. There is no information collected on nonapplicants.
These pupils only report friendship links to nonapplicants and are not designated as friends by
any pupil in the study sample. We consider them as socially isolated from the group of applicants.
Our main outcome of interest is school attendance. Regular school attendance is one condition
to continue receiving the scholarship. Using the observed attendance data, we construct an aggre-
gate that measures the percentage of time the student is found present in class during the school
visits (i.e., number of presences divided by number of visits). This measure of school attendance is
considered to be more accurate than the self-reported measure from survey data (Barrera-Osorio
et al., 2011).
3.2 Descriptive statistics
In Table 2, we present baseline descriptive statistics for pupils in the treatment and control
groups in San Cristobal. We present baseline network descriptive statistics for children from San
Cristobal in Table 3.23 In Table 4 and 5, we report the same statistics for Suba.
In San Cristobal, children are 13.5 years of age on average. Male students represent 48 percent
of the sample. Average family wealth index (official SISBEN score) is 11.6 over 100, meaning that
the average family is in the first decile of the wealth distribution. Most student are enrolled in
grades 6 to 8 (20 percent in each of these grades). About 16 percent are enrolled in each of grade 9
and 10, and only 8 percent in grade 11. Around 11 percent of the currently enrolled students had
already dropped out of school in the past. For 27 percent of them, the main reason for dropping
out is “lack of money”. Overall, 38 percent had already repeated a grade. At baseline, 22 percent
of boys (17 percent of girls) work for pay in addition to studying. Those who work for pay work
23See Appendix C for how we construct the social network matrix.
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for an average of 7 to 8 hours a week. Children enrolled in grades 9 − 11 in Suba are older by
2 years, 38 percent of boys work and study (21 percent of girls) and they work an hour more on
average. They are otherwise similar to pupils in San Cristobal (Table 4).
Looking at network characteristics for San Cristobal (Table 3), we find that children cite on
average 4.37 friends, of which 2.58 are among applicants. About 12 percent are not friends to any
other applicant, and 0.6 percent have no friends at all. Including those who are friendless, average
characteristics of direct friends (distance 1) and indirect friends (distance 2 and more) are quite
similar.
In Tables 2 and 3, we also present balancing tests on individual characteristics and character-
istics of direct and indirect friends. We do not find any significant difference in average between
experimental groups for age, gender, SISBEN poverty score, number of friends, attributes of di-
rect friends and attributes of friends at distance 2 and 3, consistent with what we expect with
randomization. As we also expect, the fraction of friends treated at distance 2 and at distance 4
is very different in the two experimental groups. This is because with nondirected networks, an
individual is always friend with himself, except for isolated individuals. When we ignore cycles
back to one-self, fraction of friends treated at distance 2 and 4 is similar in the two groups.24 The
results follow the same pattern for Suba.
Finally, in Table 6, we show attendance levels in both localities. There is a 87 percent atten-
dance rate in San Cristobal, and 86 percent in Suba (higher grades). Note that average attendance
is lower in the analysis carried out by Barrera-Osorio et al. (2011), respectively 80 percent and 78
percent. This difference comes from the fact that we restrict the sample to children who are se-
lected for the baseline survey (for which there are data on friendship links). Our sample restriction
does not alter the validity of the experiment (see Appendix tables 1 and 2).
4 Empirical results
We estimate equation (5) presented in section 2 using maximum likelihood (see Appendix D
for the expression of the likelihood).25 According to the model, attendance depends on own and
peers treatment status, as well as peers attendance choices.
24Results available upon request.
25Alternatively, one can estimate the model by Generalized 2SLS. An advantage of ML over G-2SLS is that with ML we
can exploit all the heterogeneity in the social structure to help with identification. By comparison, Generalized 2SLS only
exploits exclusion restrictions related to the presence of intransitive triads in the network.
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4.1 Peer effect parametric estimation
4.1.1 Estimation results for San Cristobal
Accounting for peer effects lowers the effect of the program on school attendance in San Cristo-
bal (Table 7). Looking at column 1, we find that lottery winners show higher attendance than
lottery losers (a significant 1.1 percentage point increase from a base mean of 87 percent). This
suggests that incentives directed to scholarship recipients work, in the sense that they do lead
them to privately increase their attendance. An increase in peers attendance results in an increase
in own attendance. The effect is small (0.03) and statistically significant. This finding is consistent
with positive complementarities between peers in time spent in social activities outside school.
In contrast, the local intensity of treatment among peers negatively impacts school attendance:
an increase in the fraction of peers treated leads to a significant drop in attendance. What may
explain that a higher fraction of treated peers is associated with lower school attendance? It may
be that treated children who dropped out of their jobs to comply with the program requirements
are freeing up labor that their peers take-up.26 When taking into account the positive endogenous
peer effect and the negative contextual effect of the treatment through peers, we find that the
overall program effect (panel 5, Table 7) is close to zero and not significant.
We find that the naive difference in mean attendance between experimental groups, (γols) is
positive and significantly different from zero (column 3). Comparing it to the estimated total
program effect (panel 5, Table 7), we find that ignoring peer effects would lead us to wrongly
conclude that a full-scale program would be effective. It is often argued that ignoring peer ef-
fects when these are present implies that the naive experimental estimator can be interpreted as a
lower-bound to the actual program effect. Intuitively, in the presence of social interactions, treated
and untreated outcomes should be closer than in the absence of interactions. Here, this is not what
we find. The reason is the following. We do indeed find evidence of a positive endogenous ef-
fect, consistent with the rest of the literature. But we also allow the treatment status of others to
affect attendance directly beyond the effect it has through behavior, and this contextual effect of
treatment is found to be negative. Results are robust to adding controls (age, gender, grade and
SISBEN score); see Columns 2 and 4.
Moreover, we find that the naive experimental estimator (γols) is only capturing the individual
mirror effect (∆mirror), that is, the effect from private incentives to attend school on program ben-
eficiaries and social influences on attendance that feedback to the group of program beneficiaries.
26That beneficiaries and peers are substitutes on the child labor market is one possible explanation for the negative
contextual effect. A behavioural explanation is also plausible. For instance, a student, who in the absence of the program
has intrinsic motivations for attending school, may respond negatively to the introduction of financial incentives for
attendance, and this effect may be stronger when more of his friends benefit from them. We provide some suggestive
evidence that the former explanation is valid (see section 4.2.6) but cannot test the behavioral explanation with the data at
hand.
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We find that the individual mirror effect (panel 3, Table 7) is positive, statistically significant and
of similar magnitude as γˆols. We actually cannot reject the hypothesis that the individual mirror
effect is equal to the difference in expected outcome between experimental groups (panel 4, Table
7).27 Because the individual mirror effect is a function of the model parameters, this constitutes a
strong test of the model. We find that the model is validated on these data.
To sum up, our results suggest that private incentives to attend school lead to a small increase
in school attendance among program beneficiaries. This effect is amplified through social inter-
action: peers reinforce each other’s behavior. Treatment status of peers also affect attendance
directly: exogenously higher intensity of treatment among peers leads to a reduction in atten-
dance. This effect is consistent with substitution between own and peers labor supply. Taken
together, treatment and peer effects on attendance implies that the program is not effective in in-
creasing school attendance. In other words, the naive experimental estimator overestimates the
actual program impact. The econometric model is tested and validated for San Cristobal.
4.1.2 Estimation results for Suba
The results for Suba (Table 8) are essentially similar to the ones obtained for San Cristobal.
Accounting for peer effects in treatment response implies that the program is not an effective
mean to improve school attendance in Suba, where the program targets higher-grade students.
While the naive experimental effect is positive, the total program effect (panel 5) is negative in
Suba and not significant. This is due to the fact that the contextual effect from the treatment more
than offsets the direct treatment effect to beneficiaries.
As in San Cristobal, winning the lottery results in a 1.2 percentage point higher attendance
(from a base mean of 86 percent). The sign of the effect is consistent with the private incentive
embedded in the program, but the effect is not statistically significant. The endogenous peer effect
is positive and statistically significant, and the contextual effect of peers treatment is negative and
statistically significant. A 1 percentage point (p.p.) higher intensity of treatment among peers
is associated with a 1.6 p.p. drop in attendance while a 1 p.p. increase in school attendance
among peers is associated with a 4.7 p.p. rise in attendance. These effects are in the same order of
magnitude as in San Cristobal. The model is also validated using data from Suba. As shown in
panel 3, the estimate of the individual mirror effect on scholarship beneficiaries, ∆ˆmirror, which
sums the effect from private incentives to attend school and social influences on attendance that
feedback to the group of program beneficiaries, is very close in value to the difference in means
between experimental groups (γˆols). As a result, we cannot reject that the two are equal (panel 4).
27Standard errors for ∆mirror are estimated using the delta method, see Appendix E.
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4.2 Robustness checks
In this section, we discuss findings from alternative specifications of the model. Robustness
checks are only performed for San Cristobal, for which the sample size is larger. For each of
these robustness checks, we discuss how we expect results to change compared to the benchmark
findings in Table 7. Overall, results from this section comfort us in our modelling choices. In
section 4.2.1, we include unobserved effects fixed at the level of the network. In section 4.2.2, we
consider the reduced-form equation in which only the treatment contextual peer effects matters.
Then, in section 4.2.3, we present estimation results treating isolated individuals differently from
others. In section 4.2.4, we also consider an alternative specification of the social interaction matrix
where links are not reciprocated. In section 4.2.5, we present semiparametric estimates that do not
impose linearity of the effect from peers treatment status. Finally, in section 4.2.6, we offer some
additional insights on the program contextual effect.
4.2.1 Fixed effects
In Table 9, we report estimation results for San Cristobal adding network fixed effects. School
fixed effects are included in order to control for all unobserved correlated effect that are fixed at the
level of the network. With randomization that ensures that everyone’s treatment is uncorrelated
with school (unobserved) attributes, both maximum likelihood estimator (estimates in Table 7)
and conditional maximum likelihood estimator (estimates in Table 9) should be consistent. As
expected, we find that our three parameters of interest (the direct program effect on beneficiaries
and the two peer effects) are similar in Table 7 and Table 9. These results are robust to the inclusion
of additional covariates.
4.2.2 Contextual effects only
In Table 10, we show estimates of a model with contextual effects only. We allow the fraction
of friends at distance-1 and the fraction of friends at distance-2 to enter the equation. This spec-
ification can be considered as an approximation of the reduced-form equation (4).28 Neither the
direct program effect, nor the two contextual effects are statistically significant using data for San
Cristobal. This result could lead us to dismiss peer effects as not being important. But, it is actu-
ally consistent with our result in Table 7 showing that endogenous and contextual peer effects are
of opposite signs. This finding also stresses the relevance of separately estimating endogenous
and contextual peer effects.
28It is an approximation in the sense that we stop at friends at distance-2.
19
4.2.3 Isolated individuals
In Table 11, we present estimates for San Cristobal of model (2) restricting the sample to ex-
clude isolated individuals. We find that the direct program effect is similar to the benchmark from
Table 7. The magnitude of the treatment contextual effect and of the endogenous peer effect are
also similar. The total program effect is not significantly different from zero.
In model (2), the intercept should not be the same for isolated individuals and individuals
who are not isolated. But in our estimation we impose that intercepts be the same. Allowing for
different intercepts should provide additional variation to identify the endogenous effect. When
we allow intercepts to differ for isolated and nonisolated students, the coefficient of the treatment
contextual effect is unaffected (Table 12). The magnitude of the endogenous effect is slightly
higher, but the total effect of the program is still not significantly different from zero. Socially
isolated students show lower attendance than students reporting having friends.
4.2.4 Directed network
We now estimate a model for which we use a directed social interaction matrix. Indeed, re-
ported friendship links may not be reciprocal. We relax our hypothesis that all friendship links are
reciprocated. Our findings are quantitatively robust to this assumption: direct and indirect effects
are of the same size, sign and significance level with directed links (Table 13) than with undirected
links (Table 7). This is not surprising given that identification relies on intransitive triads: if the
triad is intransitive when links are undirected, it is also with directed links. Similarly, if the triad
is not intransitive when links are reciprocal, then it is not intransitive with unreciprocated links.
4.2.5 Semi-parametric model
A potential concern is that the specification of the model may be driving our results. We now
consider a semi-parametric specification. Do parametric estimates have limited support in the
data? Is linearity too strong an assumption?
We estimate the following semiparametric model with contextual effects only:
yi = pi1ti + h((Gt)i) + ui (9)
We provide details of the estimation in Appendix F.
We find that the estimated function is globally flat (Figure 2). The confidence interval is extremely
wide at the right-end of the data range (dotted lines). The function is estimated with good sta-
tistical precision over the range of points from [0; 0.8]. In Figure 3 , we can see that most of the
data support is for values of (Gt)i between [0; 0.8] , and very few individuals have more than 80
percent of their friends treated. Taken together, these findings suggest that the linear-in-means
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Figure 3: Density of the fraction of friends treated in San Cristobal
4.2.6 Program contextual effect
Another potential concern is that the treatment contextual effect is a mere by-product of the
experiment: with a scaled-up program, should we expect peers treatment to affect individual
choice directly, beyond its effect through peers choices? To answer this question, one would need
to unfold the mechanisms through which the treatment contextual effect is generated. E.g., if it
is caused by the substitution in peers labor supply, should we still expect substitution when the
program is at-scale?
We first show that substitution in peer labor supply is a plausible explanation for why, holding
peers’ attendance fixed, own attendance decreases as the fraction of treated peers increases. To do
so, we interact the program contextual variable (fraction of treated friends) with a dummy that
identifies students aged 13 and above (students enrolled in higher grades). The idea is that older
children are more likely to participate in the labor market in the absence of the program. Recall
that, in order to keep receiving monetary benefits, students are required to attend school on a reg-
ular basis. So, we can expect that treated students enrolled in higher grades are the most affected
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by the conditionality. For substitution in peer labor supply to be a plausible explanation, the pro-
gram contextual effect should be even more negative for the group of students in higher grades.
Our findings provide support for this explanation. In San Cristobal (Table 14), the program con-
textual effect is not statistically different from zero for younger students. For older students, it is
negative, statistically significant and more than three time the magnitude of the effect reported in
the main estimation result pooling all students together (Table 7).29
Even though the evidence is consistent with a substitution in peers labor supply, the extent of
substitution may be smaller for a program at-scale. Indeed, with a program at-scale, all applicants
receive cash benefits upon regular attendance, freeing up labor for their peers from more well-off
families who may not be interested in substituting for them. Then, a conservative approach is
to consider that expression (7) gives a bound to the total effect. The other bound is obtained by
setting δ1 = 0.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we account for peer effects in order to assess a scholarship program intended
to limit child labor and improve progress through school in two poor neighborhoods of Bogota.
Our setting is one where assignment to the treatment is at the individual level, so that treated and
untreated individuals may be influencing each other. We use a model that exploits information on
the fine structure of interactions. Besides providing evidence of peer effects in schooling, we find
that ignoring peer effects leads to a biased evaluation of the program actual impact. Through the
endogenous peer effect, the positive effect on school attendance from receiving program benefits
is magnified. But the social multiplier on school attendance is small and this effect is more than
offset by the negative effect through peers treatment status. This unintended negative contextual
effect of the treatment is found to be consistent with substitution between peers’ labor supply.
We also investigate whether the results may be driven by our modelling choices. We propose
a way to test the model specification which relates the model parameters to the difference in ex-
pected outcome between experimental groups. We validate the model based on data from both
localities (each locality features its own randomized experiment). We also estimate a semipara-
metric version of the model and find that the linearity-in-means assumption holds on the data
support.
One limitation of our work, driven by the data at hand, is that we cannot account for peer
effects between program applicants and nonapplicants. Our randomized experiment is limited to
the set of applicants. Although we argue that decision-makers may not be interested in benefits
to nonapplicants in the case of this scholarship program, accounting for benefits to nonapplicants
may be important in other contexts.
29Results for Suba are very similar (Table 15).
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Table 1: Distribution of research subjects by experimental group
Suba San Cristobal
—————————— ——————————
T =0 T=1 Total T=0 T=1 Total
Grades 6-8 0 0 0 1,196 2,240 3,436
Grades 9-10 455 400 855 643 1,147 1,790
Grades 9-11 619 527 1,146 822 1,482 2,304
Total 619 527 1,146 2,018 3,722 5,740
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Table 2: Pupils descriptive statistics at baseline, San Cristobal
Sample Control Difference T-stat
(N=5,740) (N=2,018)
Age 13.53 13.57 -0.05 -0.94
(1.93) (1.92) (0.03)
Male 0.48 0.48 0.009 0.65
(0.50) (0.50) (0.009)
SISBEN score 11.63 11.75 -0.17 -1.34
(4.54) (4.64) (0.08)
Grade 6 0.21 0.20 0.007 0.68
(0.41) (0.40) (0.0107)
Grade 7 0.21 0.21 -0.0008 -0.07619
(0.40) (0.40) (0.007)
Grade 8 0.18 0.18 0.0024 0.22
(0.38) (0.38) (0.007)
Grade 9 0.16 0.16 0.004 0.38
(0.37) (0.37) (0.007)
Grade 10 0.14 0.15 -0.014 -1.46
(0.35) (0.36) (0.006)
Grade 11 0.089 0.088 0.0013 0.16
(0.28) (0.28) (0.005)
Ever dropped out 0.11 0.11 -0.0027 -0.32
(0.31) (0.31) (0.006)
Reason for dropping out: lack of money 0.27 0.25 0.018 0.51
(0.44) (0.44) (0.025)
Repeated a grade 0.38 0.38 -0.002 -0.15
(0.48) (0.48) (0.009)
Paid work 0.17 0.18 -0.0056 -0.53
(0.38) (0.38) (0.007)
Hours worked 7.51 7.95 -0.67 -0.95
(10.34) (11.31) (0.50)
Note: mean and standard deviation in parenthesis; difference and standard error in parenthesis.
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Table 3: Network descriptive statistics at baseline, San Cristobal.
Sample Control Difference T-statistics
Individual characteristics
Number of friends 4.37 4.371 -0.0011 -0.037
(1.12) (1.13) (0.021)
Number of friends among applicants 2.58 2.53 0.076 1.39
(2.01) (1.95) (0.036)
No friends 0.006 0.008 -0.0017 -0.74
(0.08) (0.09) (0.0016)
No friends among applicants 0.127 0.13 -0.005 -0.52
(0.33) (0.33) (0.006)
Characteristics of friends at distance-1
Treated 0.54 0.54 0.002 0.20
(0.42) (0.42) (0.007)
Age 11.19 11.31 -0.19 -1.30
(5.3) (5.24) (0.098)
Male 0.41 0.42 -0.006 -0.52
(0.45) (0.45) (0.008)
SISBEN score 9.72 9.87 -0.22 -1.44
(5.52) (5.54) (0.10)
Characteristics of friends at distance-2
Treated 0.54 0.27 0.42 52.3
(0.37) (0.25) (0.004)
Age 11.19 11.32 -0.19 -1.36
(5.29) (5.22) (0.097)
Male 0.41 0.41 -0.0006 -0.053
(0.43) (0.43) (0.008)
SISBEN score 9.71 9.80 -0.11 -0.77
(5.27) (5.27) (0.1)
Note: mean and standard deviation in parenthesis; difference and standard error in parenthesis.
Continued on next page
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Table 3 – continued from previous page
Sample Control Difference T-statistics
Characteristics of friends at distance-3
Treated 0.54 0.51 0.04 4.41
(0.37) (0.37) (0.007)
Age 11.18 11.31 -0.19 -1.29
(5.28) (5.22) (0.097)
Male 0.41 0.42 -0.008 -0.70
(0.42) (0.43) (0.008)
SISBEN score 9.73 9.87 -0.21 -1.45
(5.26) (5.28) (0.14)
Characteristics of friends at distance-4
Treated 0.54 0.32 0.34 40.56
(0.36) (0.27) (0.005)
Age 11.19 11.31 -0.19 -1.33
(5.28) (5.21) (0.09)
Male 0.41 0.41 -0.003 -0.25
(0.41) (0.41) (0.007)
SISBEN score 9.71 9.78 -0.10 -0.70
(5.17) (5.16) (0.09)
Note: mean and standard deviation in parenthesis; difference and standard error in parenthesis.
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Table 4: Pupils descriptive statistics at baseline, Suba
Sample Control Difference T-stat
(N=1,146) (N=619)
Age 15.25 15.21 0.082 1.13
(1.23) (1.22) (0.051)
Male 0.40 0.40 0.004 0.14
(0.49) (0.49) (0.02)
SISBEN score 13.54 13.43 0.23 0.90
(4.23) (4.23) (0.17)
Grade 9 0.39 0.39 0.008 0.29
(0.49) (0.48) (0.02)
Grade 10 0.35 0.34 0.015 0.55
(0.47) (0.47) (0.019)
Grade 11 0.25 0.26 -0.023 -0.93
(0.43) (0.44) (0.018)
Ever dropped out 0.12 0.12 0.003 0.18
(0.32) (0.32) (0.013)
Reason for dropping out: lack of money 0.26 0.3 -0.08 -1.10
(0.44) (0.46) (0.055)
Repeated a grade 0.37 0.35 0.04 1.41
(0.48) (0.47) (0.019)
Paid work 0.28 0.29 -0.033 -1.26
(0.45) (0.45) (0.019)
Hours worked 8.26 7.81 1.033 0.97
(8.82) (6.57) (0.51)
Note: mean and standard deviation in parenthesis; difference and standard error in parenthesis.
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Table 5: Network descriptive statistics at baseline, Suba
Sample Control Difference T-statistics
Individual characteristics
Number of friends 4.37 4.32 0.11 1.66
(1.11) (1.19) (0.049)
Number of participating friends 1.81 1.76 0.12 1.18
(1.76) (1.71) (0.07)
No friends 0.008 0.009 -0.002 -0.38
(0.093) (0.098) (0.004)
No friends among applicants 0.22 0.22 -0.008 -0.33
(0.41) (0.42) (0.017)
Characteristics of friends at distance-1
Treated 0.33 0.34 -0.012 -0.51
(0.41) (0.41) (0.017)
Age 10.72 10.48 0.53 1.27
(7.00) (7.09) (0.29)
Male 0.28 0.27 0.022 0.87
(0.42) (0.42) (0.017)
SISBEN score 9.67 9.34 0.71 1.71
(6.95) (6.92) (0.29)
Characteristics of friends at distance-2
Treated 0.33 0.13 0.44 22.97
(0.38) (0.19) (0.008)
Age 10.71 10.49 0.47 1.14
(7.00) (7.09) (0.29)
Male 0.28 0.27 0.02 0.81
(0.40) (0.40) (0.016)
SISBEN score 9.65 9.34 0.68 1.69
(6.80) (6.81) (0.28)
Note: mean and standard deviation in parenthesis; difference and standard error in parenthesis.
Continued on next page
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Table 5 – continued from previous page
Sample Control Difference T-statistics
Characteristics of friends at distance-3
Treated 0.33 0.32 0.025 1.11
(0.38) (0.38) (0.015)
Age 10.72 10.47 0.53 1.28
(7.00) (7.08) (0.29)
Male 0.28 0.27 0.02 0.85
(0.40) (0.40) (0.016)
SISBEN score 9.66 9.36 0.65 1.61
(6.82) (6.82) (0.28)
Characteristics of friends at distance-4
Treated 0.33 0.15 0.39 20.26
(0.37) (0.21) (0.009)
Age 10.71 10.49 0.47 1.13
(6.98) (7.09) (0.29)
Male 0.28 0.27 0.02 0.95
(0.39) (0.39) (0.016)
SISBEN score 9.66 9.35 0.66 1.65
(6.77) (6.78) (0.28)
Note: mean and standard deviation in parenthesis; difference and standard error in parenthesis.
32
Table 6: School attendance by experimental group.
Suba San Cristobal
—————————— ——————————
T =0 T=1 Total T=0 T=1 Total
Grades 6-8 0 0 0 0.872 0.881 0.878
(0.16) (0.15) (0.16)
Grades 9-10 0.855 0.873 0.865 0.867 0.878 0.874
(0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Grades 9-11 0.857 0.872 0.863 0.869 0.880 0.876
(0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17)
Observations 619 527 1,146 2,018 3,722 5,740
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Table 7: Main estimation results for school attendance in San Cristobal
Max-Lik. Max-Lik. with controls OLS OLS with controls
Individual characteristics
Intercept 0.8574 0.9645 0.8711 0.927
(0.0115) (0.0198) (0.0035) (0.0165)
Treatment = 1 0.0112 0.0111 0.0098 0.0100
(0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0044)
Age — -0.0146 — -0.0135
(0.0017) (0.0017)
Male — -0.0038 — -0.0023
(0.0039) (0.0042)
Grade — 0.0104 — 0.0131
(0.0022) (0.0022)
SISBEN score — 0.0010 — 0.0018
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Peer effects
Contextual -0.0104 -0.0107 — —
(0.0056) (0.0056)
Endogenous 0.0308 0.0274 — —
(0.0066) (0.0065)
Individual mirror effect
∆mirror 0.0111 0.0109 — —
(0.0041) (0.0041)
Model validation
H0: ∆mirror = γols 0.2005 0.163 — —
Total effect 0.0008 0.00037 — —
(0.0072) (0.0071)
Observations 5740 5740 5740 5740
Note: Controls are age, gender, grade and SISBEN score.
Standard errors for the individual mirror effect and total effect are calculated using the delta method.
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Table 8: Main estimation results for school attendance in Suba.
Max Lik. Max Lik. with controls OLS OLS with controls
Individual characteristics
Intercept 0.8308 1.0009 0.8575 0.7873
(0.0323) (0.0736) (0.0075) (0.0800)
Tertiary = 1 0.0129 0.0136 0.0148 0.0154
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0111) (0.0111)
Age — -0.0077 — -0.0049
(0.0044) (0.0055)
Male — -0.0059 — -0.0090
(0.0091) (0.0113)
Grade — -0.0048 — 0.0134
(0.0071) (0.0086)
SISBEN score — -0.0001 — 0.0013
(0.0011) (0.0013)
Peer effects
Contextual -0.0163 -0.0164 — —
(0.0123) (0.0123)
Endogenous 0.0472 0.0448 — —
(0.0124) (0.0125)
Individual mirror effect
∆mirror 0.0126 0.0133 — —
(0.0089) (0.0089)
Model validation
H0: ∆mirror = γols -0.1552 -0.1498 — —
Total effect -0.0035 -0.0029 — —
(0.0163) (0.0162)
Observations 1146 1146 1146 1146
Note: Controls are age, gender, grade and SISBEN score.
Standard errors for the individual mirror effect and total effect are computed using the delta method.
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Table 9: Fixed effects model - School attendance in San Cristobal
Max-Lik. Max-Lik. with controls OLS OLS with controls
Individual characteristics
Treatment = 1 0.0112 0.0961 0.0110 0.0109
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0041)
Age — -0.0152 — -0.0149
(0.0017) (0.0017)
Male — -0.0049 — -0.0036
(0.0039) (0.0039)
Grade — 0.0091 — 0.0103
(0.0022) (0.0022)
SISBEN score — 0.0009 — 0.0011
(0.0004) (0.0004)
Peer effects
Contextual -0.0098 -0.01304 — —
(0.0056) (0.0056)
Endogenous 0.0298 0.0233 — —
(0.0066) (0.0065)
Individual mirror effect
∆mirror 0.0111 0.0095 — —
(0.0041) (0.0041)
Model validation
H0: ∆mirror = γols 0.0308 -0.2392 — —
Total effect 0.0014 -0.0035 — —
(0.0072) (0.0071)
Observations 5740 5740 5740 5740
Note: Controls are age, gender, grade and SISBEN score.
Standard errors for the individual mirror effect and total effect are computed using the delta method.
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Table 10: Contextual effects only - School attendance in San Cristobal.
Intercept 0.8721 0.9803
(0.0113) (0.0196)
Treatment = 1 0.0075 0.0087
(0.0052) (0.0051)
Contextual peer effects 0.0003 -0.0001
(0.0057) (0.0056)












Table 11: Excluding isolated individuals - School attendance in San Cristobal.
Max-Lik. Max-Lik. with controls OLS OLS with controls
Individual characteristics
Intercept 0.8542 0.9497 0.8783 0.9109
(0.0126) (0.0228) (0.0043) (0.0196)
Treatment = 1 0.0084 0.0077 0.0051 0.0047
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0053) (0.0052)
Age — -0.0123 — -0.0119
(0.0021) (0.0022)
Male — -0.0038 — -0.0036
(0.0047) (0.005)
Grade — 0.0082 — 0.0132
(0.0026) (0.0027)
SISBEN score — 0.0007 — 0.002
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Peer effects
Contextual -0.0104 -0.0112 — —
(0.0064) (0.0064)
Endogenous 0.0389 0.0361 — —
(0.0091) (0.0091)
Individual mirror effect
∆mirror 0.0082 0.0075 — —
(0.0049) (0.0049)
Model validation
H0: ∆mirror = γols 0.4350 0.3869 — —
Total effect -0.0020 -0.0036 — —
(0.0084) (0.0083)
Observations 3895 3895 3895 3895
Note: Controls are age, gender, grade and SISBEN score.
Standard errors for the individual mirror effect and the total effect are calculated using the delta method.
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Table 12: Dummy for isolated individuals - School attendance in San Cristobal.
Max-Lik. Max-Lik. with controls OLS OLS with controls
Individual characteristics
Intercept 0.8601 0.9676 0.8625 0.9198
(0.0124) (0.0204) (0.0046) (0.0167)
Treatment = 1 0.0111 0.011 0.0097 0.0098
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0044)
Isolated = 1 -0.0032 -0.0032 -0.0128 -0.0115
(0.0052) (0.0052) (0.0045) (0.0045)
Age — -0.0146 — -0.0135
(0.0017) (0.0018)
Male — -0.0038 — -0.0025
(0.0040) (0.0042)
Grade — 0.0102 — 0.0131
(0.0022) (0.0022)
SISBEN score — 0.001 — 0.0018
(0.00045) (0.0005)
Peer effects
Contextual -0.0107 -0.0109 — —
(0.0056) (0.0056)
Endogenous 0.0287 0.0253 — —
(0.0075) (0.0074)
Individual mirror effect
∆mirror 0.0110 0.0109 — —
(0.0042) (0.0041)
Model validation
H0: ∆mirror = γols 0.2134 0.1736 — —
Total effect 0.0004 0.0002 — —
(0.0072) (0.0071)
Observations 5740 5740 5740 5740
Note: Controls are age, gender, grade and SISBEN score.
Standard errors for the individual mirror effect and the total effect are calculated using the delta method.
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Table 13: Directed network - School attendance in San Cristobal.
Max-Lik. Max-Lik. with controls OLS OLS with controls
Individual characteristics
Intercept 0.8618 0.9688 0.8711 0.9279
(0.0112) (0.0195) (0.0035) (0.0165)
Treatment = 1 0.0111 0.0110 0.0098 0.099
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0044)
Age — -0.0145 — -0.0135
(0.0017) (0.0018)
Male — -0.0038 — -0.0023
(0.0039) (0.0042)
Grade — 0.0100 — 0.0131
(0.0022) (0.0022)
SISBEN score — 0.0010 — 0.0018
(0.00045) (0.00047)
Peer effects
Contextual -0.0128 -0.0124 — —
(0.0056) (0.0056)
Endogenous 0.0291 0.0252 — —
(0.0061) (0.0061)
Individual mirror effect
∆mirror 0.0110 0.0109 — —
(0.0041) (0.0041)
Model validation
H0: ∆mirror = γols 0.18911 0.1555 — —
Total effect -0.0017 -0.0015 — —
(0.0071) (0.0071)
Observations 5740 5740 5740 5740
Note: Controls are age, gender, grade and SISBEN score.
Standard errors for the individual mirror effect and total effect are computed using the delta method.
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Table 14: Dummy for older students - School attendance in San Cristobal
M-L M-L with controls OLS OLS with controls
Intercept 0.8516 0.9537 0.8711 0.9279
(0.0136) (0.0241) (0.0035) (0.0164)
Treatment = 1 0.0092 0.0093 0.0098 0.0100
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0044)
Age — -0.0142 — -0.0135
(0.002) (0.0017)
Male — -0.0011 — -0.0023
(0.004) (0.0042)
Grade — 0.0101 — 0.0131
(0.0023) (0.0022)
Sisben — 0.0009 — 0.0018
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Contextual 0.0065 -0.0104 — —
(0.0070) (0.0076)
Older × Contextual -0.0317 -0.0049 — —
(0.0063) (0.0079)
Endogenous 0.0367 0.0332 — —
(0.0068) (0.0068)
Observations 5740 5740 5740 5740
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Table 15: Dummy for older students - School attendance in Suba
M-L M-L with controls OLS OLS with controls
Treatment = 1 0.0139 0.014 0.0148 0.0153
(0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0111) (0.0111)
Age — -0.0054 — -0.0075
(0.0048) (0.0075)
Male — -0.0062 — -0.009
(0.0091) (0.0113)
Grade — -0.004 — 0.0127
(0.0071) (0.0087)
Sisben — -0.0001 — 0.0013
(0.0011) (0.0013)
Contextual 0.0142 0.0025 — —
(0.0178) (0.0191)
Older × Contextual -0.0434 -0.0268 — —
(0.0183) (0.0206)
Endogenous 0.0467 0.045 — —
(0.0125) (0.0125)
Observations 1146 1146 1146 1146
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Appendix Tables
Table 16: Validation of experimental design in San Cristobal
Full sample (N = 6,366) Restricted sample (N = 5,740)
—————————————————— ——————————————————
Control group mean Difference by Control group mean Difference by
(s.d.) treatment status (s.e.) (s.d.) treatment status (s.e.)
Age 13.62 0.048 13.56 0.05
(1.96) (0.034) (1.92) (0.035)
Male 0.48 -0.025 0.47 -0.009
(0.49) (0.008) (0.49) (0.009)
SISBEN score 11.77 0.165 11.74 -0.17
(4.66) (0.082) (4.63) (0.08)
Grade 6 0.21 0.023 0.20 -0.007
(0.41) (0.07) (0.40) (0.07)
Grade 7 0.21 -0.009 0.21 0.0008
(0.40) (0.072) (0.40) ( 0.76)
Grade 8 0.17 -0.0082 0.18 -0.002
(0.37) (0.006) (0.38) ( 0.007)
Grade 9 0.16 -0.034 0.16 -0.0039
(0.37) (0.006) (0.37) (0.007)
Grade 10 0.15 -0.008 0.15 0.014
(0.36) (0.006) (0.36) (0.006)
Grade 11 0.084 -0.004 0.088 -0.001
(0.27) (0.005) (0.28) (0.005)
Notes: Restricted sample excludes observations with missing identification number, i.e., observations that cannot be matched with
baseline network data.
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Table 17: Validation of experimental design in Suba
Full sample (N = 3,402) Restricted sample (N = 1,146)
—————————————————— ——————————————————
Control group mean Difference by Control group mean Difference by
(s.d.) treatment status (s.e.) (s.d.) treatment status (s.e.)
Age 15.16 -2.13 15.21 0.082
(1.84) (0.044) (1.21) (0.051)
Male 0.46 -0.036 0.40 0.0041
(0.49) (0.012) (0.49) (0.020)
SISBEN score 13.17 0.54 13.43 0.23
(4.41) (0.11) (4.23) (0.18)
Grade 9 0.098 0.31 0.39 0.008
(0.29) (0.007) (0.49) (0.02)
Grade 10 0.08 0.27 0.34 0.015
(0.27) (0.006) (0.47) (0.019)
Grade 11 0.06 0.17 0.26 -0.024
(0.23) (0.006) (0.44) (0.018)
Notes: Restricted sample excludes observations with missing identification number, i.e., observations that cannot be matched with
baseline network data.
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Appendix A Treatment of missing data









0 · · · mNnN

that is, a (N ×N) diagonal matrix with (m1n1 , ..., mNnN ) on the diagonal and 0 elsewhere. Writing
model (5) in matrix notation yields:
y = αι + β(∆G1y) + γ1t + δ1(∆G
1t) + u.
The associated reduced form is thus as follows:
y = α(I− β∆G1)−1ι + (I− β∆G1)−1(γI + δ1∆G1)t+(I− β∆G1)−1u. (10)
Therefore, in order to adapt model (2) from the previous section, one just needs to replace the
interaction matrix in that model by ∆G1.
Appendix B Proof of Proposition 2
In the following, we derive the proof using the social network matrix restricted to participants.
From Equation (5): E(yi|ti = 1) = α1−β + γ1 + (γ1β + δ1)Σ∞k=0(β)kE[(Hk+1t)i|ti = 1] + E(vi|ti = 1),E(yi|ti = 0) = α1−β + (γ1β + δ1)Σ∞k=0(β)kE[(Hk+1t)i|ti = 0] + E(vi|ti = 0).
where H = ∆G1 for ease of notation and v = (I− βH1)−1u.
Let t = ti + t−i, where ti = (0, ..., 0, 1, 0, ..., 0)′. Thus, Ht = H(ti + t−i). Randomization of the
treatment ensures that the expected fraction of treated among friends at any distance k (excluding
oneself) is the same for treated and control units: E[(Hkt−i)i|ti = 1] = E[(Hkt−i)i|ti = 0]. In
addition, for all k, E[(Hkti)i|ti = 0] = 0, which implies Σ∞k=0(β)kE[(Hk+1ti)i|ti = 0] = 0. But
E[(Hkti)i|ti = 1] may not be equal to zero:
Σ∞k=0(β)
kE[(Hk+1ti)i|ti = 1] = E[(H(i− βH)−1ti]i|ti = 1) = E[(H(i− βH)−1]ii|ti = 1),
where [H(i−βH)−1]ii is the ith element on the diagonal of H(i−βH)−1. Thus, Σ∞k=0(β)kE[(Hk+1ti)i|ti =
1] = 1N Tr(H(i − βH)−1). In addition, randomization ensures that: E(vi|ti = 1) = E(vi|ti = 0).
The result follows.
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Appendix C Construction of the social interaction matrix
Our sample includes all the applicants to the program in both localities. But, students may
name as friends individuals who are not in the sample. We follow a three-steps procedure to
construct the matrix of social interaction:
1. All friendship links to a non-applicant (missing) are coded as NA.
2. We build the adjacency matrix. Note that the matrix includes a line for each isolated indi-
vidual and a line and a column for all non-applicant friends.
3. In the last step, we eliminate the non-applicant friends (line and column).
Appendix D Maximum likelihood
The school-level reduced-form of model (4) can be written in matrix notation, as follows:
ys = (Is − βHs)−1(Zsθ + us),
where Hs = (∆G1)s for ease of notation. Variables and matrices are written at the school level
where each school is of size Ns, and where Zs = (ιs, ts,Hsts) and θ = (α, γ1, δ1).
We account for correlations bettween individual error terms within schools by allowing for
clustering. Let the error term uis can be written as the sum of a network effect and a idiosyncratic
error such that uis = vs + eis. Suppose vs follows a normal distribution of mean 0 and variance
σ2s and eis follows also a normal distribution of mean 0 and variance σ2e . The log-likelihood of the
whole sample is then given by the following expression:

























where νs = (Is − βHs)ys − Zsθ] and ρ = σ2s/σ2e .
Appendix E Model validation
We use the delta method to obtain an estimate of the variance for the right-hand side of ex-
pression (8):
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1− βλi , (11)
where λi are the eigenvalues of matrix G and θ = (γ1, δ1, β)′. Applying the delta method to
y = h(θˆ):
y = h(θ) + h′.(θˆ − θ) + higher order terms,
where h′ = ∂h
∂θˆ



































Let Σ be the variance-covariance matrix of vector θˆ. As N →∞, we have:
E(h(θˆ))= h(θ),
V (h(θˆ))= h′Σh.
Appendix F Estimation details for the semi-parametric model
We assume that the error term is independent of own treatment status and mean treatment in
the peer group. In the following, to account for missing data on non-participants, simply replace
G by H where H = ∆G1. Formally, our identifying condition is:
E(ui|ti, (Gt)i) = 0
We estimate the parameters of interest, following a three-step procedure (Robinson, 1988):
1. We estimate the following quantities in a non-parametric fashion:
yˆ∗i = yi − Eˆ(yi|(Gt)i)
tˆ∗i = ti − Eˆ(ti|(Gt)i)








3. We replace the estimated value of pi1 in model (9) and obtain the following expression:
yi − pˆi1ti = h((Gt)i) + ui
The final step consists of non-parametrically estimating h((Gt)i) using the Nadaraya-Watson
(Nadaraya 1964 and Watson 1964) estimator.
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